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Cooperative Energy Scheduling for Microgrids
under Peak Demand Energy Plans
Amir Valibeygi and Raymond A. de Callafon
Abstract—A cooperative energy scheduling method is pro-
posed that allows joint energy optimization for a group of
microgrids to achieve cost savings that the microgrids could
not achieve individually. The discussed microgrids may be
commercial entities in a distribution network under utility
electricity rate plans comprising both Time of Use (ToU) and
peak demand charge. Defining a stable operation as a situation
where all microgrids would be willing to participate, it is shown
that under such rate plans and in particular due to the peak
demand charge, a cost distribution that is seemingly fair does
not necessarily result in a stable cooperation. These results
are derived in this paper using concepts from cooperative
games. It is therefore sought to devise a stable cost distribution
algorithm that, while maximizing some measure of fairness
among the participating microgrids, ensures they all benefit
from their participation. A simple case study is presented that
demonstrates fairness and stability aspects of the cooperation.
I. INTRODUCTION
For many small and medium-size commercial and in-
dustrial entities, electric utility charges involve two main
components, one accounting for the entity’s weighted hourly
consumption (Time of Use or ToU) and the other for its peak
demand during the entire billing interval (demand charge).
ToU pricing imposes different unit prices at different times of
the day to urge the users to shift their loads from certain peak
hours to off-peak hours. On the other hand, peak demand
charge urges the users to flatten their overall demand profile
to realize smaller peak to average ratio.
Currently in California, peak demand charges account for
up to 50% of some industrial users’ monthly electricity costs
[1]. Users’ response to such pricing is dependent on their
flexibility for time-shifting their loads as well as their energy
storage capacity. While energy storage can be exploited by
users to optimally schedule their consumption and reduce
their costs, it can also benefit the grid by increasing its relia-
bility under periods of high demand [2]. Optimal scheduling
of energy storage is a major topic of interest for electricity
users of different sizes. For some major contributions see
[3], [4]. While each user with energy storage can optimize
its storage schedule, joint energy scheduling and optimization
between multiple microgrids may further reduce their total
cost. This can be roughly attributed to the fact that by joint
scheduling, users who under-utilize their energy storage at
some or all parts of the day can make it available to other
users who need it at those times. The role of cooperative
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optimization in reducing intermittency and uncertainty has
also fueled the interest in cooperative optimization methods
[5]. Different works have studied cooperative management of
loads and storage and joint optimization between multiple
users [6], [7]. In [5], the authors consider the problem of
cooperative energy management for two microgrids with
ToU energy cost aiming to achieve total cost reduction as
a result of cooperation. Shared ES management for a group
of microgrids with profit coefficient sets is considered in
[8]. The authors of [9] propose a stochastic formulation of
the cooperative energy scheduling problem for a group of
microgrids and consider ToU as well as operating costs of
their local energy resources. The work of [10] proposes a
model predictive framework for cooperative optimization of
a network of interconnected microgrids and discusses the
attained total cost saving for all users.
While the approaches proposed in the earlier works present
feasible strategies for total cost saving by a group of users
under cooperation, they do not discuss distribution of the
obtained total savings between the participating users. It is
desired to investigate mechanisms that make such exchange
profitable for all participating parties so as to encourage
participation. The work of [11] discusses cooperative power
management between multiple microgrids with renewable
generation and proposes a pareto-optimal solution using
Nash bargaining that encourages microgrids to participate.
In [12], the authors discuss fairness in optimal coordination
of multiple users with quadratic energy cost. Also, the
work [13] studies cooperative management in the wholesale
electricity market and presents cost allocation solutions that
have certain favorable properties. In [14], the authors have
used a cooperative game approach to tackle direct energy
trading between DERs and energy consumers. In general,
division of the attained cost saving between participating
users in a fair and stable manner constitutes the major issue
in the considered cooperative games [15].
In this work, we are interested in a specific yet prevailing
case of cooperative energy scheduling; the case of multiple
microgrids under ToU and demand charge energy plans. Cost
distribution when the cost structure includes peak demand
terms presents important stability implications that have not
yet been addressed to the best knowledge of the authors.
We will show that first, under such cost structure, joint
scheduling will result in reduced total cost. Next, we will
investigate how some cost distributions may de-stabilize the
collaboration due to the existence of peak demand term in
the cost function. An alternative algorithm is then proposed
that can provably guarantee the benefit of all users from
participation in the collaboration while maximizing some
measure of fairness among them. Our main contribution lies
in the consideration of demand charge in the cost structure
which leads to non-submodularity of the cost function and
therefore necessitates careful consideration of stability. We
will show that for this problem, a stable distribution of the
optimal cost between the users that is desirable from all
users’ standpoints will always exists and will provide an
approach for computing such distribution.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND BENCHMARK PROBLEM
Consider a distribution system with a single energy
provider (utility) and a set of microgrids N = {1, 2, ..., N}
where each microgrid n ∈ N is equipped with a smart
meter and means of two-way data communications with the
utility and other users. The terms user and microgrid are
used interchangeably throughout the paper. Some users may
additionally possess a battery energy storage (ES) system.
The set C = {C1, C2, ..., CN} indicates the energy storage
capacity of each user. We further take the set of time
intervals T = {1, 2, ..., T } where each t ∈ T has length
∆T to represent the energy scheduling horizon. The energy
demand vector for each user n ∈ N is defined as dn ,[
d1n, d
2
n, ..., d
T
n
]
while energy flow from the grid to user n
is xn ,
[
x1n, x
2
n, ..., x
T
n
]
. The sum of energy supplied to
each user from the main grid and from the user’s ES during
interval t ∈ T should equal dtn. The energy provided by
the ES is denoted by etn. Each user n ∈ N with storage
capability can supply part or all of its demand according to
dtn = x
t
n + e
t
n (1)
and its storage charge level cn varies as
ct+1n = c
t
n − e
t
n (2)
Such user can make dispatch decisions for storage
charge/discharge (etn) to optimize its electricity consumption
subject to the following storage constraints
eminn ≤ e
t
n ≤ e
max
n
cminn ≤ c
t
n ≤ c
max
n (3)
ct0n = c
tend
n
While this simplified model is adopted to only capture salient
dynamics of the system and demonstrate the pivotal ideas of
this work, the methods are mostly applicable under more
complex microgrid models.
The energy consumers in this study are commercial and
industrial users that are billed under both ToU and demand
charge pricing plans. The total cost of energy for user n
under such rate plans can be computed as
fn(xn) =
T∑
t=1
ptxtn + α max
t∈T
xtn (4)
where pt is the ToU unit price at time t and α is the demand
charge coefficient.
Optimization 1. The cost minimization problem for each
individual user having ES can be formulated as
minimize
xn
fn(xn) (5)
subject to (1− 3)
The optimal solution x∗n to this problem will result in the
optimal cost fn(x
∗
n). The above problem has a convex objec-
tive function and affine constraints and therefore is a convex
program [16]. If each user solves its energy optimization
(optimization 1) individually without cooperation with other
users, the total cost of all users would become
fnon−coop =
N∑
n=1
fn(x
∗
n) =
N∑
n=1
[ T∑
t=1
ptxtn
∗
+ α max
t∈T
xtn
∗
]
Next, we consider how a few users may cooperate to reduce
this overall cost.
III. COOPERATIVE OPTIMIZATION
A. Motivation
Medium and large-scale energy consumers have diverse
demand patterns and often significantly high peak-to-average
demand ratios. While demand charge is a major part of total
energy cost for such consumers, substantial demand charges
may be incurred due to uneven demand distribution and
high peak-to-average ratio [1]. The addition of storage for
reducing peak demand could significantly reduce demand
charge in such cases. Although individual microgrids can
utilize their ES to optimize their demand as described in
the previous section, joint storage utilization between mul-
tiple users in a distribution network can potentially bring
additional benefits. This can be attributed to the benefits
gained by shared storage utilization as well as the fact
that sum of users peaks is always greater than or equal
to the peak of the collective consumption of all users. We
propose a method of joint optimization between multiple
microgrids with identical cost structures, such that the group
of collaborating microgrids, although physically remote, will
purchase electricity from the main grid as a whole. This
can be further conceptualized by considering an aggregator
that manages interaction and cooperation of participants and
represents them as a whole.
The main questions that we are after answering in this
section are the following:
1. Does forming a cooperation between the microgrids
under the described cost structure result in attaining a lower
total cost?
2. How should the savings attained as a result of cooper-
ation be distributed between the participants?
We devote the rest of this section to answering these
questions.
B. Centralized Cooperative Optimization
Consider a group of microgrids some of which having
energy storage and suppose that energy flow between the
main grid and the group is measured at a virtual point of
connection. Denoting the power flow at this point by x, the
total cost incurred by such group of users is
fcoop(x) =
T∑
t=1
ptxt + α max
t∈T
xt (6)
Optimization 2. The cooperative optimization problem can
be formulated as
minimize
x
fcoop(x) (7)
subject to the constraints
xt =
N∑
n=1
dtn −
N∑
n=1
etn
ct+1n = c
t
n − e
t
n ∀n ∈ N (8)
eminn ≤ e
t
n ≤ e
max
n ∀n ∈ N
cminn ≤ c
t
n ≤ c
max
n ∀n ∈ N
The optimal cost resulting from this optimization is denoted
by f∗coop. Similar to optimization 1, this problem is a convex
program and can be solved using standard techniques [16].
C. Cooperative Game Framework for User Collaboration
We use concepts from cooperative games to study how
different users may form coalitions to attain payoffs that
would not be possible if they were to optimize their demand
individually and how this increased payoff should be divided
between them such that it satisfies some measures of fairness
and stability. In this section, we introduce a few concepts
from cooperative games including the notions of fairness
and stability and will apply them to the cooperative energy
optimization problem.
Consider the same set of users N as the previous section.
Any nonempty subset S ⊆ N is called a coalition between
the members of S. A coalitional cost game between the
members of N is a pair (N , v) where N is the set of users
and v(S) : 2N → R+ is a set function representing the cost
of each coalition S ⊆ N . In a cost game, users prefer less
cost and therefore may form coalitions to reduce the total
cost.
Definition 1: A cooperative game (N , v) is called an LP
game if its set cost function can be expressed as v(S) =
min
x
uTx subject to linear constraints on x.
We define the cost of each coalition S as v(S) = f∗coop,S .
Here f∗coop,S is the optimal cost resulting from the coalition
of users of set S. The coalition N , i.e. the coalition of all
users in N is called the grand coalition. We also define ψ ∈
RN as the vector of cost distribution between all users in the
grand coalition with each user’s cost being ψi.
Definition 2: A game (N , v) is said to be sub-additive if
given that S∩T = φ it results that v(S∪T ) ≤ v(S)+v(T ).
Proposition 1: The above game (N , v) with v(S) =
f∗coop,S is sub-additive.
Proof: Suppose S and T are two disjoint sets of users
and f∗coop,S and f
∗
coop,T are their respective optimal costs.
Now assume these two sets of users join to form the coalition
S ∪ T . If in the joint coalition, both sets of users S and T
maintain their optimal schedules x∗S and x
∗
T from the optimal
solution to optimization 1 (this is possible because S and T
are disjoint), then
fcoop,S∪T =
T∑
t=1
pt(xtS + x
t
T ) + α max
t∈T
(xtS + x
t
T )
≤
T∑
t=1
ptxtS + α max
t∈T
xtS +
T∑
t=1
ptxtT + α max
t∈T
xtT
= f∗coop,S + f
∗
coop,T
Therefore, for the above joint schedule, we will always
have fcoop,S∪T ≤ f∗coop,S + f
∗
coop,T . Since we always have
f∗coop,S∪T ≤ fcoop,S∪T , it results that f
∗
coop,S∪T ≤ f
∗
coop,S+
f∗coop,T or v(S ∪ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ).
This property implies that the total saving increases as
more users participate in the game. It can also be intuitively
verified that since the peak demand of the unified entity
over a time horizon will always be equal or smaller than the
sum of peak demands of all users, if all users maintain their
optimal individual schedule without considering other users’
schedules, the cost of the unified entity will be at worst equal
to the sum of individual costs of all users. We have therefore
found the answer to question I. While the sub-additivity
property discusses the total saving of all participating users,
it does not discuss the distribution of savings between the
users. The next section will address the distribution of the
total optimal cost between the users.
D. Distribution of saving from Cooperative Optimization
So far we have shown that the cost achieved as a result
of cooperation between a group of users is at worst equal
to the sum of costs of individual users if no cooperation
took place. However, this does not necessarily lead to all
users paying a lower cost than they did individually. In fact,
whether or not users will be subject to a lower cost depends
on the distribution of the total cost between the users.
Two important concepts often considered while specifying
cost distribution are stability and fairness. We will further
characterize these two notions and study our cooperative
game with regards to fairness and stability.
Fairness. A fair cost distribution ψ ∈ RN divides the total
cost of a cooperation based on different users’ contributions
in achieving that cost. The well-known characterization of
fairness given be Shapley [17] that attributes certain desirable
properties to a fair distribution is given as
Theorem 2: [17] Given the coalitional game (N , v) with
v(S) = f∗coop,S , the unique cost distribution ψ(N , v) that
divides the entire saving of the grand coalition between the
users and satisfies fairness axioms of [17] is given by
ψn(N , v) =
1
|N |!
∑
S⊆N\n
|S|! (|N | − |S| − 1)!
[
v(S ∪ n)− v(S)
]
where |N | and |S| are the cardinality of N and S respec-
tively. The fairness axioms and proof can be found in [17].
The outcome of this theorem assigns portion ψn of the total
saving to each user n, also known as the Shapley value
of user n. The above computation involves determining the
average marginal contribution of user n over all the different
ways that the grand coalition can be formed from the zero
coalition. Therefore one should solve optimization 2 for all
possible subsets of the grand coalition and then compute the
marginal contribution of each user using the above relation.
Stability. Although the Shapley distribution guarantees
fair and efficient distribution of the saving between the
users in accordance with the given axioms, there is still no
guarantee that such saving is binding for all users. In fact,
we now aim to address the question of stability of the grand
coalition: under the Shapley saving distribution given above
and despite the fact that the game is sub-additive, could
there be any incentive for a user or a group of users to
refrain from joining the grand coalition and form smaller
coalitions among themselves? To answer this question, we
next introduce the concept of core in coalitional games.
Definition 3: A cost distribution vector ψ ∈ RN is in the
core of a coalitional game (N , v) if and only if
∑
n∈N
ψn = v(N ) and
∑
s∈S
ψs ≤ v(S), ∀S ⊂ N (9)
In other words, in order for a coalition to be stable, the
sum of savings of any subset of users should be greater or
equal to the saving that those users would have obtained
if that subset actually formed a sub-coalition. It is now
reasonable to assume that rational users participating in a
coalitional game would want to form the grand coalition
only if the saving distribution vector is drawn from the
core. We can henceforth relate the concept of core with
the stability of a coalitional game. This concept is similar
to the concept of Nash equilibrium in cooperative games.
The difference here is that instead of investigating whether
a single user can benefit by deviating from an action, we
turn our attention to possible deviation of a group of users
in order to form their own coalition. It can be shown [18]
that the core of a cooperative game may be empty. If a
game has an empty core, no saving distribution can possibly
guarantee the stability of the grand coalition. In such case, a
player or group of players may opt for smaller coalitions to
increase their savings. The following theorem will examine
non-emptiness of the core for the game considered in this
work.
Corollary 3: The core of the game (N , v) with v(S) =
f∗coop,S is non-empty.
Proof: Since v(S) = f∗coop,S = minimize
x
fcoop,S(x)
can be expressed as a linear program with the linear cost
functions of optimization 2, this game is an LP game. It can
be proved [19] that an LP game has a nonempty core and
therefore the core of the above game is non-empty.
It can be shown that if the core of a coalitional game exists,
it may not be unique [18]. For certain class of games known
as submodular games, if the cost is distributed according to
Shapley distribution, then the grand coalition will be stable.
Definition 4: A game (N , v) is said to be submodular
(concave) if v(S∪T )+v(S∩T ) ≤ v(S)+v(T ), ∀S, T ⊆ N
or equivalently v(S∪{i})−v(S) ≥ v(T ∪{i})−v(T ), ∀S ⊆
T ⊆ N\{i}, ∀i ∈ N .
In the following, we will investigate the submodularity of
the considered collaborative cost minimization game.
Proposition 4: The game (N, v) with v(S) = f∗coop,S is
not submodular.
Fig. 1. Users demand and consumption patterns without storage capacity.
Top: Demand profiles for each of the users 1, 2, and 3. Bottom: Resulting
demand profiles if coalitions form between different subsets of users.
Proof: We will show that this game violates the
submodularity property by a simplified example of a three-
user cooperative game. Assume that three users none of
which have storage capacity participate in a cooperative
power sharing game. Also for simplicity assume that p(t) =
0, ∀t ∈ T , so only demand charge is applicable. Suppose the
demand of each of the users follows the profiles of Fig. 1.
Taking S = {1} and T = {1, 2} as two possible coalitions
between the users and i = 3, we see that such coalitions
satisfy S ⊆ T ⊆ N\{i}. Now, it can be seen from Fig. 1
that
v(S) = 2 , v(S ∪ {i}) = 3 , v(T ) = 3 , v(T ∪ {i}) = 5
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = 1  2 = v(T ∪ {i})− v(T )
Therefore the above game is not sub-modular according
to definition 4.
It can further be shown that if the cost function contains
onlly the ToU term, the game would satisfy the submod-
ularity condition. The proof is eliminated due to space
constraints. The lack of submodularity is therefore due
to the existence of peak demand cost term. The lack of
submodularity implies that the resulting Shapley value may
fail to fall within the core of the game [19], as will be shown
in the numerical case study of the next section. However,
according to corollary 3, the core of the game is non-empty
in both cases and therefore, one should be able to find another
cost distribution that falls within the core. In fact, according
to definition 3, all distributions ψn that satisfy the inequalities
(9) constitute the core.
IV. FAIR AND STABLE COST DISTRIBUTION ALGORITHM
Non-emptiness and non-uniqueness of the core imply that
multiple payoff distributions might exist that are within the
core. In the ideal case, the Shapley distribution is chosen
over other possible distributions due to its fairness properties.
However, if Shapley distribution is not within the core (is not
stable), we would want to have another notion of fairness that
helps us pick one distribution among all stable distributions.
To this end, we would define our notion of fairness as the
difference between the highest and lowest percentage cost
saving among all users for a given distribution vector. Using
this fairness index, the stable and fair payoff distribution
problem is formulated as
minimize
ψ
∆
subject to
∑
n∈N
ψn = v(N)
∑
s∈S
ψs ≤ v(S), ∀S ⊂ N (10)
Λmin ≤
v({n})− ψn
v({n})
≤ Λmax, ∀n ∈ N
∆ = Λmax − Λmin
In this LP, the first two constraints enforce stability while the
next two constraints formulate a measure of fairness as the
difference between maximum and minimum percentage cost
saving among all users. The objective is then to minimize this
difference subject to stability constraints. Since the game is
proved to have a non-empty core, the solution of this LP will
always exist and will fall within the core of the game. Based
on this program, we formalize the following cooperative
optimization and cost distribution algorithm between a group
of users. It should be noted that since the resulting cost
distribution will be drawn from the core, it is in the interest
of all users regardless of their demand pattern and storage
capacity to participate in this game.
Algorithm 1 Cooperative optimization and cost sharing
1: Collect load data for all users
2: Solve the cooperative optimization (optimization 2) with
cost function (6) subject to the constraints (8)
3: Distribute the total cost between the users according to
Shapley distribution
4: Check if the Shapley distribution falls within the core
by checking conditions (9)
5: If Shapley distribution is within the core then
6: Distribute the cost according to Shapley distribution
7: else
8: Compute a fair and stable distribution by solving the
linear program (10)
9: End if
By following this algorithm, a stable payoff distribution
is computed so that all users will have an incentive to join
and form the grand coalition. This cost distribution algorithm
provides the answer to question II.
Remark. The complexity of checking condition (9) grows
exponentially with |N |. Therefore for very large number
of participating microgrids, the Shapley computation steps
and its stability checks may be skipped. The proposed
optimization (10) can directly be used to obtain a stable
distribution in such cases to ensure scalability of the cost
distribution.
V. CASE STUDY
Consider three users with load demand profiles shown
in Fig.2 left and storage capacities of respectively
500, 300, 700 kWh. The load profiles represent predictions
for two industrial and one commercial facility. Suppose these
consumers are under the same ToU and peak demand charge
electric rate plan. Normalized ToU price tariffs are shown in
Table I. Also, the normalized peak demand charge coefficient
is equal to 10.
TABLE I
TOU UNIT PRICES (pt)
Time 9am-12pm 12pm-6pm 6pm-9pm 9pm-9am
pt 1.5 2 1.5 1
0 6 12 18 24
Time [hr]
300
400
500
600
700
800
Po
w
er
 [k
W
]
Users power demand
User 1
User 2
User 3
0 6 12 18 24
Time [hr]
300
400
500
600
700
800
Optimized power flow at PCC w/o cooperation
User 1
User 2
User 3
Fig. 2. Left: Demand profiles for three industrial/commercial users. Right:
Results of individual optimization (solution of optimization 1)
Solving the convex optimization (optimization 1) individ-
ually for each user results in power flow profiles of Fig.
2, right. Next, solving the cooperative scheduling problem
(optimization 2) for these users, the total cost of the system
reduces from 67432 to 66174 as a result of joint scheduling.
The optimal cost of other possible sub-coalitions are also
shown in Table II. Fig. 3 compares total power flow of the
three microgrids under individual versus joint scheduling.
The flattened utility power profile under cooperative schedul-
ing explains the lower cost achieved under the cooperation.
Next, Shapley values are computed to obtain the share of
each user in the total cost. It is observed that the following
condition is violated
v(13) = 45851  45873 = ψ1 + ψ3
and therefore the Shapley distribution is not within the core
of the game. Following algorithm 1, we then compute a fair
cost distribution from the core by solving (10). The resulting
stable distribution is compared with other distributions in
Fig. 4. Satisfaction of the following inequalities verifies
the presence of this distribution within the core and hence
stability of the game.
v(1) = 25522 ≥ 24881 = ψ1
v(2) = 20399 ≥ 20324 = ψ2
v(3) = 21510 ≥ 20970 = ψ3
v(12) = 45806 ≥ 45205 = ψ1 + ψ2
v(13) = 45851 ≥ 45851 = ψ1 + ψ3
v(23) = 41587 ≥ 41294 = ψ2 + ψ3
v(123) = 66174 = 66174 = ψ1 + ψ2 + ψ3
0 6 12 18 24
Time [hr]
1250
1300
1350
1400
1450
1500
1550
1600
1650
1700
Po
we
r fl
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 [kW
]
Cooperative Scheduling
Non-cooperative Scheduling
Fig. 3. Result of cooperative optimization between all users (blue) vs. sum
of all users’ consumption under individual optimization (red).
1 2 3
User index
1.8
2
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104
No Storage
Individual Scheduling
Coop. Scheduling w/ "Fair" Dist.
Coop. Scheduling w/ "Shapley" Dist.
Fig. 4. Cost of each user under individual optimization vs under different
distributions of the coalitional optimization. Notice the reduction in cost if
each user employs storage individually and also if users conduct cooperative
scheduling.
VI. CONCLUSION
For a group of microgrids participating in energy plans
involving peak demand charge, a cooperative energy schedul-
ing algorithm is proposed that reduces the total energy cost
as well as individual costs of each microgrid. Stability of
the coalition is investigated by studying properties of the
considered cost structure. To motivate participation among
microgrids, a cost allocation algorithm is proposed that
maximizes some measure of cost distribution fairness while
satisfying stability properties of the distribution.
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